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Examination of legal and economic literature reveals two
different views of job-transactions. The prevailing legal concept
seems to be that the job is a contractual relationship between
two individuals having an equal footing before the law. In con-
tiast, the prevailing industrial concept of the job seems to be
that of a bargaining relationship between unequal individual
members of groups, concerning the disposal and conditions of
opportunities to work. Both views grow out of past experience.
The legal view originated in the customs and practices of master
and servant; these have been modified here and there as the more
up-to-date customs of employers and employees have been
deemed sufficiently general and certain to warrant incorporation
into the law. The contract of a master with his servant was
like the contract between the buyer and seller of a commodity.
This parallel is still dominant in the more modern law of em-
ployers and employees, and the courts do not seem inclined to
permit a classification which distinguishes the labor contract
from the commodity contract. Economists, however, are fam-
iliar with the distinction that in the labor contract the worker
delivers himself on the job, whereas, in the commodity contract,
the seller delivers to the buyer something separable from the
person.
Courts and attorneys seem to visualize the worker in a world
of equal legal opportunities, whereas the worker experiences
only unequal, limited economic opportunities. As long as the
]aw sets up the same legal obstacles to complete freedom of con-
tract for employers and workers, the law need not, indeed cannot,
concern itself with what the parties do to each other.' But the
it is said by the Kansas Supreme Court (87 Kansas, p. 759) to
be a matter of common knowledge that 'employees, as a rule, are not finan-
cially able to be as independent in making contracts for the eale of their
labor as are employers in making contracts of purehse thereof.' No doubt,
wherever the right of private property exists, there must and vill be
inequalities of fortune; and thus it naturally happens that parties negoti-
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difference in bargaining power causes the economic consequences
of identical legal rules to vary widely for employers and
workers.2 In other words legal equality and economic equality
are not identical.
Another distinction centers in the res of the job-transaction.
Before the law the job-contract determines legally enforceable
rights and duties 3 supported by remedies granted by the courts.
But to the average worker the job-bargain determines what kind
of living he can get in the struggle for life. Hence, to the worker,
the opportunity of getting the courts to enforce employers'
promises is subordinate to the opportunity to get work on the
best terms possible.
It is possible also to discern a difference with regard to the
time element. The law looks to the past to find legal validity for
the rights and duties of the contract, and to find what rights and
obligations were mutually exchanged. The parties themselves
look to the future to find economic security for their expectations.
The above statements are but various ways of expressing the
clash between judicial and industrial practices, customs, and
working rules-a clash which frequently is argued back and
forth in the courts. From the broadest social point of view, in
analyzing the job we deal with the task of harmonizing legal and
economic institutions. How does the law affect economic be-
havior? How can legal customs be modified to meet the practical
needs of the parties enlisting the aid of the courts? From an
economic point of view we observe that the clash between the
working rules of employers and of workers, when submitted to
the law, results frequently in decisions which aggravate the
problems of efficiency, good will, and stability.
The experience of the Rochester men's clothing market from
1919 to 1922 is brought forward as an illustration of the concept
of the job as a bargain and of the process of stabilizing the
ating about a contract are not equally unhampered by circumstances. This
applies to all contracts, and not merely to that between employer and em-
ployee. Indeed, a little reflection will show that wherever the right of
private property and the right of free contract co-exist, each party, when
contracting, is inevitably more or less influenced by the question whether
he has much property, or little, or none; for the contract is made to the
very end that each may gain something that he needs or desires more
urgently than that which he proposes to give in exchange. And, since it
is self-evident that, unless all things are held in common, some persons
must have more property than others, it is from the nature of things im-
possible to uphold freedom of contract and the right of private property
without at the same time recognizing as legitimate those inequalities of
fortune that are the necessary result of the exercise of those rights." Cop-
page v. Kansas, 236 U. S. 1, 17, 35 Sup. Ct. 240, 244 (1916).
2 See State v. Coppage, 87 Kan. 752, 755-6, 125 Pac. 8, 9 (1912).
3 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS Z1920) §§ 1, 2; 2 ibid. c. 30; ANSON, CON-
TRACTS (Huffeut ed. 1903) §§ 4, 6, 7, 9.
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bargaining relations between employers and employees by the
development of working rules through extra-judicial arbitration
machinery. The footnotes will show corresponding legal
opinions.
There are at least three reasons for the selection of the period
1919-1922: (1) During these three years the Rochester clothing
market experienced both prosperity and depression; (2) The
jurisdiction of the arbitrator was broad 4 and reports of cases
were relatively complete; (3) After 1922 the jurisdiction of the
arbitrator was narrowed 5 and reports of cases were so brief as
to make it impossible to analyze the situation from the published
record alone.
From 1919 to 1922 bargaining was carried on under two
agreements. 6  The first and more or less informal agreement
was negotiated in February, 1919 between a group of employers,
organized as the Rochester Clothiers' Exchange, and the Amalga-
mated Clothing Workers 7 while the latter organization was en-
4AGREELTENT FOR 1920-1922, See. 9: "The board (Labor Adjustment
Board)' shall have authority to make such rules, regulations, and supple-
mentary arrangements not inconsistent with this agreement as may be
necessary to carry into effect the principles of this agreement or to apply
these principles to new situations whenever they arise. It may also define,
describe and limit the penalties to be imposed for the violation of any of
the provisions of this agreement.
See. 8: '. . . All disputes or differences over questions arising under
this agreement which the parties hereto are unable to adjust between them-
selves shall be referred to the Labor Adjustment Board for adjustment or
arbitration. This board shall have full and final jurisdiction over all
such questions, and its decisions shall be conclusive, except as may be
otherwise provided by agreement between the parties hereto. Except where
the board itself shall otherwise determine, the chairman of the board shall
be authorized to take original jurisdiction of all cases and controversies
arising under this agreement and to adjust or decide them in accordance
with rules of practice and procedure established by the board. Decisions
of the chairman shall be binding on both parties . .P
5 AGREMENT FOR 1922-1925, § 11: "... . The duties and jurisdiction of
the arbitrator are fixed and limited by this agreement. He shall have no
power to enlarge such jurisdiction unless by mutual consent of the two
parties to this agreement . .P
r A strike in 1913, involving members of the United Garment Workers,
was settled partly through mediation by state officials. The terms of
settlement included dealing with committees of employees, but not recog-
nition of, or dealings with, the union. Winslow, Collcctivc Agrccuacnts in
the Men's Clothing Industry, Bulletin 198, U. S. Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics (1916) 144-149.
Labor difficulties with two firms in 1918 led to the Ripley-Kirstein avard.
The adjustment machinery established to work out this award prepared the
way for negotiating the agreement in 1919 without a strike. For one ac-
count of the Ripley-Kirstein award, see REPORT or GrA.mL ExEcum='
BOARD OF AmAmuIATED CLOTHING WORKEs To 4TiH BlLErNmL COvE1,'TrO;,
BOSTON, 1920, 39-43.
7 Agreements were negotiated on behalf of the members of the local
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gaged in strikes to secure the 44-hour week and market agree-
ments in Chicago and New York. This agreement, effective
from April 1, 1919 to May 1, 1920, provided for the "open shop,"
collective bargaining through shop chairmen or outside rep-
resentatives of the union, a procedure for handling complaints,
arbitration of unsettled disputes by a jointly chosen and jointly
paid arbitrator, the 44-hour week, and negotiation or arbitra-
tion of wage scales."
A two-year agreement followed in May, 1920.2 This agree-
ment carried on most of the principles worked out during the
first year, including the open shop feature, and established some
new principles. It included specific hiring, discharge, and equal
division of work clauses; recognized the employer's right to
make changes in manufacturing methods; established the princi-
unions by the Joint Board, usually acting with the advice and assistance of
the national president of the union. Under Art. XIV, § 14, of the Constitu-
tion of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers, "All acts of the Executive
Board (i. e., of the local union, or the Joint Board of the locals in a district)
shall be subject to the ratification of the organization." By the same
clause of the constitution, "in cases where a boycott is considered necessary
by the local Executive Board the matter shall be submitted to the General
Executive Board, or the General Convention, for approval and action." By
Art. XI, § 1, strikes had to be submitted to the General Executive Board
of the Union for endorsement.
These provisions of the Union's constitution are cited because one of the
questions raised in juridical consideration of a collective agreement, such
as a contract, is the extent of the power of union officials to bind members.
The power of union officials to act as agents in the formation of trade
agreements or otherwise, so as to bind the union membership and possible
outsiders, depends upon the general laws of .agency. For a statement of
the agency doctrine as to union officers, see WRIGHTINGTON, UNINCIORPORATED
AssocIATIONS AND BusINEss TRuSTS (2d ed. 1923) § 67; Grinnol, Analysis
of Legal Value of a Labor Union Contract (1907) 41 AM. L. REV. 197,
206; 24 Cyc. 824; 16 R. C. L. 425; SAYRE, CASES ON LABOR LAW (1922) c.
13. See also the following cases which illustrate the application of the
agency doctrine to disputes involving construction of collective agreements.
Barnes & Co. v. Berry, 169 Fed. 225 (C. C. A. 6th, 1909) (power of offi-
cials to negotiate binding agreement must be expressly authorized) ; Burnetta
v. Iarceline Coal Co., 180 Mo. 241, 79 S. W. 136 (1904); Hudson v. Cin-
cinnati, New Orleans and Texas Pacific Railway Co., 152 Ky. 711, 154 S.
W. 47 (1913) (officials may not bind individual members without their
express assent); Langmade v. Olean Brewing Co., 137 App. Div. 355, 121
N. Y. Supp. 388 (4th Dept. 1910) (the specific provisions of individual
employment contracts override conflicting provisions of the collective agree-
ment); Saulsberry v. Coopers' International Union, 147 Ky. 170, 143
S. W. 1018 (1912) (union alone empowered to make agreements regarding
the use of the union label).
8 A written version of this understanding may be found in the REPORT OF
THE GENERAL EXECUTIVE BOARD OF THE AMiALGAiATED CLOTHING WORKERS,
op. cit. supra note 6, at 45-46.
9 The full text of the written agreement may be found in (1920) 11
MONTHLY LABOR RPv. 1220-1221.
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ples of a minimum wage and the abolition of home work; created
administrative machinery for handling disputes, exercising sani-
tary control of shops, and developing supplementary rules
governing new situations; and specified the procedure by which
changes in wage levels and wage rates should be made. The
agreement briefly stated the general principles according to
which bargaining should be carried on from day to day. Being
in general terms, it was inevitable that disputes over the appli-
cation of the agreement to specific conduct should arise. The
process of adjusting these disputes required continuous collec-
tive bargaining and arbitration machinery and resulted in new
interpretations which amplified the general rules of the agree-
ment.
The machinery of collective dealing was simple. The em-
ployees in each shop elected a representative to take up com-
plaints with the foreman or labor manager, in the first instance.
If no agreement was reached, the shop chairman called in a
business agent of the union. If still no agreement was reached,
the next step was to refer the matter to the Labor Adjustment
Board of the market. This board was composed of the business
agents of the union, the labor managers of the various firms in
the Clothiers' Exchange, and an "Impartial Chairman" selected
and paid jointly by the union and the employers' organization.
Representatives of employers and representatives of workmen
usually voted as a group; in case of a tie the Chairman cast the
decisive vote. The Board had final jurisdiction and a decision
of the Impartial Chairman was binding on both parties. In
practice the Chairman functioned as an arbitrator having both
original and final jurisdiction.
The employers had agreed to give up a measure of their con-
trol over jobs. But even under this general concession an indi-
vidual worker in Rochester found his job-opportunities menaced
by several risks: (1) the risk that a non-union or out-of-town
worker might get a job ahead of him; (2) the risk that tenure
of the job (continued opportunity to earn a living) might be
terminated by his employer, other employers, or other workers;
(3) the risk that opportunities to work might be withdrawn for
a longer or shorter period; and (4) the risk that opportunities to
capitalize skill and experience might be destroyed by changes in
manufacturing technique.
To reduce the first risk it was agreed to establish for Rochester
union workers preferential access to opportunities to work. To
modify the second and third risks it was agreed to establish de-
tailed rules indicating when and under what circumstances oc-
cupancy of the job might be terminated, either permanently or
temporarily. The fourth risk could not be eliminated but its
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harsh effects might be softened. The cases which are subse-
quently analyzed are grouped according to the following scheme:
1. Access to job-opportunities





c. Lay-off and permanent reduction of force
d. Introduction of machinery.
I ACCESS TO JOBS-HIRING TRANSACTIONS
The hiring clause of the agreement stated:
"The power to hire shall remain with the employer, but in
cases where discrimination on account of union membership is
charged, the Impartial Chairman shall have the right of review;
and if facts are brought before the Impartial Chairman that
appear to indicate that the labor policy of any house is calculated
to undermine the union, he shall have the power to review that
policy." 10
On its face this clause established an open shop in which union
men and non-unionists should receive equal treatment. There
were, however, two supplementary understandings which made
this clause more specific. One was that the first two weeks of
employment would be regarded as a probationary period during
which the employer might discharge freely; the other was that
during unemployment employers would give opportunities to
work to Rochester workers in preference to out-of-town workers.
The earliest cases arose from charges of blacklisting."' In
10 Omitting supplementary agreements regarding notice of discharge or
quitting, (infra p. 16) the individual contracts of employment made under
this clause were so-called contracts at will. More specifically, the legal re-
lations of employers and employees, as individuals, were embodied in a
series of unilateral contracts to pay for work done. In New York the rule,
with a few exceptions, is that a contract of service for no stipulated time is
a hiring at will which creates no legal obligations on either party to con-
tinue the relations in the future, that is, creates no mutual executory obli-
gations. In Rochester this rule might be varied because of the clear,
though unwritten, understanding that a week's notice should be given be-
fore discharge or quitting. 2 WLISTON, op. cit. supra note 3, § 1027. The
courts are divided on the question whether, in the absence of an express
stipulation, a term may be presumed from the weekly payment of wages.
1 WiiaSTON, op. cit. supra note 3, § 39; 39 C, J. § 18. Whether a term
may be presumed by reason of the duration of the collective agreement was
discussed in Hudson v. Cincinnati Ry., supra note 7, the court holding that
the collective agreement did not bind members to serve for any definite
period.
11 Compare the arbitral treatment of alleged blacklisting with the legal
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Case 64 - the union complained that a worker was refused em-
ployment after two weeks' work because a labor manager told
the employer that the worker could not be hired.'- The hearings
disclosed that the worker had been fired after several days work,
re-employed within a half a day, worked two weeks, and was
then let go at the instigation of a labor manager. There were
no charges that the worker had left his previous employer with-
out a week's notice. In the absence of such charges, the arbitra-
tor ruled that the worker could not be denied employment, and
ordered him reinstated with pay for time lost.
treatment in Boyer v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 124 Fed. 246 (E. D.
Mo. 1903) (employer's blacklist of union men not remediable in equity);
Goldfield Consolidated Mines Co. v. Goldfield Miners' Union No. 220, 159
Fed. 500 (D. Nev. 1908) (agreement among mine operators not to em-
ploy members of the union held not to be an unlawful conspiracy; a statute
similar to that involved in Coppage v. Kansas, szpra note 1, being declared
unconstitutional); Wiliner v. Silverman, 109 Md. 341, 71 Atl. 962 (1909)
(black-list which prevented plaintiff from securing employment held an
actionable wrong for which plaintiff might sue for damages).
n3a These cases are reported in mimeograph form by the Rochester arbi-
trator chiefly for the information and guidance of the parties to the
agreement in the local market Cases are numbered as complaints are
filed with the arbitrator and these docket numbers have been used through-
out the article. The writer prepared a digest (unpublished) of the writ-
ten opinions of the arbitrator during the first three years of the collective
agreement. Occasionally significant opinions of the arbitrator are cur-
rently noted in the MONTHLY LABOR REvMW, of the United States Depart-
ment of Labor.
2 The Clothiers' Exchange established a central clearing house for listing
the employees of each firm. Notices of accessions to, and separations from,
the payroll of each firm were sent to the Exchange. Prior to hiring any
individual worker, the custom was for an employer to telephone the Ex-
change and obtain a "release" on the worker from the previous employer.
In this manner a check was kept on the worker's conformity to the wceh's
notice rule. Since the arrangement was instituted in a time of labor short-
age, it also served in a measure to protect employers from the temptation
to "steal labor" by raising wages. When shops started up after the "be-
tween-season" slump, the clearing house system was of some assistance to
employers needing new workers. Furthermore, it afforded to the arbitrator
a check upon the bare facts of employment, which were sometimes disputed
in cases involving discharges during the probationary period and quitting
without notice. In hiring, no questions were asked regarding union affili-
ations. Compare Street v. Shipowners' Association of Pacific Coast, 263
U. S. 334, 44 Sup. Ct. 119 (1923); Anderson v. Shipowners' Association of
Pacific Coast, 272 U. S. 359, 47 Sup. Ct 125 (1920) (in which the opera-
tions of an employers' association registration bureau were declared within
the scope of the Sherman Act); Industrial Association of San Francisco v.
United States, 268 U. S. 64, 45 Sup. Ct. 403 (1925), rcv'g 293 Fed. 925
(N. D. Cal. 1923) (in which use of "permit system" controlling access to
materials, for the purpose of effecting the "open shop" in the local building
industry, was held not to interfere with interstate commerce); Tilbury v.
Oregon Stevedoring Co., 7 F. (2d) 1 (C. C. A. 9th, 1925) (in which an
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In Case 115, a worker gave notice of quitting, intending to get
a custom job at higher wages. This opportunity was with-
drawn at the request of some member of the firm for which he
had worked. The worker subsequently obtained another job
from which he was suspended at the request of a labor manager.
Complaint was therefore made of unjust discrimination in hir-
ing. The arbitrator ruled: "The worker violated no agreement
when he gave a week's notice because he had a better job."
Since the arbitrator was unable to fix the responsibility for loss
of time on any one individual, the Clothiers' Exchange was
ordered to compensate the worker.
In Case 122 a worker was discharged after working one week,
at the request either of a former employer or the Clothiers' Ex-
change.13 The arbitrator ruled that the employer's right to dis-
charge during the probationary period was not absolute, but
limited by the "spirit and purposes of the agreement." In the
language of his decision:
"Such discharges whether made during the first week of em-
ployment or at any other time, cannot be approved ... The right
to discharge during the first two weeks must be limited by the
spirit and purposes of the agreement. If this right were held
to be absolute so that an employee who has done nothing wrong,
and whose work is satisfactory to the employer, may be dis-
charged at the instigation of other employers, then a blacklist of
the worst kind would be legalized. At the same time the right
of the Union to tell its members where they may or may not
work would also have to be considered an absolute right, so that
it might keep workers from going to certain factories and thus
tie up shops as effectively as if a strike were called." 14
In Case 139 a worker had quit without notice, and the con-
tractor who employed him had not insisted upon a week's notice.
Subsequently another employer refused to hire this worker be-
cause he had not given a week's notice to the contractor. The
worker lost time until the contractor notified the Exchange that
he had acquiesced in the quitting without notice. This was held
to be an invasion of the worker's rights.
employers! registration system, which prevented plaintiff from obtaining
employment, was held not to be an obstruction of interstate commerce).
13 The situation was similar to that in Willner v. Silverman, supra noto
11. Compare with State v. Justus, 85 Minn. 279, 88 N. W. 759 (1902),
sustaining an anti-blacklisting statute. As to the efficacy of such stat-
utes, see COI'IMoNs & ANDREws, PRINCIPLEs OF LABon LEGISLATION (3rd ed.
1927) 123-125.
14 In Carnellier v. Haverhill Shoe Manufacturers' Association, 221 Mass.
554, 109 N. E. 643 (1915), a blacklist was declared illegal and likened to
a boycott, Worthington v. Waring, 157. Mass. 421, 32 N. E. 744 (1892),
being overruled.
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"Employers who give references on any employees who leave
them must be careful to tell the exact truth 'c as to whether they
quit with or without notice and no one has a right to interfere
with any workman getting another job."
In Case 210 a worker was hired by a foreman and told to re-
port for work the following day, at which time he was refused
employment because he had worked for and quit the firm before.
There was no evidence of blacklisting.
"Under the circumstances the Chairman does not think it
wise to reinstate the man, as the firm could discharge him again
within the two weeks' probationary period."
Three decisions pertaining to preference in hiring '  during
slack employment followed the above cases. In two of the three
the transaction also involved alleged discrimination against non-
union men.
In Case 230 a firm hired an out-of-town sleeve sewer when
two former sleeve sewers of the same firm were unemployed.
The union contended that with Rochester sleeve sewers out of
work, the firm was obligated to hire one of them in preference
to the out-of-town worker, according to the informal under-
standing. The arbitrator found that the firm had sent for both
local workers, one of whom quit and the other left town. He
therefore ruled that the firm had fulfilled its obligations under
the informal agreement and was privileged to hire the out-of-
town worker.17
1 Probably an injurious false statement regarding discharge is action-
able even in the absence of statutes. Willner v. Silverman, supra note 11.
A statute was involved in Hundley v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co.,
105 Ky. 162, 48 S. W. 429 (1898), in which a false statement of the reason
for discharge was held actionable. The Missouri Service Letter Act, which
required corporations doing business in the state to give discharged or
quitting employees, upon request, a letter stating the work performed and
cause of separation, was upheld in Prudential Insurance Co. v. Cheek, 259
U. S. 530, 42 Sup. Ct. 516 (1922).
11 In the absence of other faults, a preferential shop agreement is clearly
lawful. Underwood v. Texas & P. IL Co., 178 S. W. 38 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915).
A preferential shop agreement was involved in Schlesinger v. Quinto, 201
App. Div. 487, 194 N. Y. Supp. 401 (1st Dept. 1922), in which the union
obtained an injunction restraining an employer's breech of the collective
agreement.
17 Where an agreement allows an employer to hire in the open market
if the union is unable to furnish workers (a common form of agreement),
an employer will not be enjoined from e.xercising this option. Goyette v.
Watson Co., 245 Mlass. 577, 140 N. E. 285 (1923). But the result is prac-
tically a closed shop, for the union usually tries to organize such non-
unionists as rapidly as possible, and non-unionists are induced to join
through hope of getting better terms of employment, by limiting compeAi-
tion for jobs, and by union protection of the job, or through fear of
losing their jobs. Not infr&quently a trade agreement specifically requires
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In Case 455 the union complained that a presser, who had been
expelled from the union, was hired by a firm when there were
other local seam pressers out of work. The firm argued that
the worker in question had had Rochester experience before
leaving town for Europe and that the union had not filled the
firm's requisition for a presser. The ruling was that if the union
could furnish a presser at once,18 he should be given prior con-
sideration.19
In Case 801 the union complained that a recently hired off-
presser had no right to the job because of unemployment in that
operation. The worker had been an assistant foreman in another
house and hence not a union member. Before that he had
worked as an off-presser for the employer who had just hired
him. The arbitrator cited the "unwritten understanding that
when there is unemployment in any craft no worker of the same
craft shall be given a job if he does not already belong to the
industry in this market." The worker in question was not a
learner 20 nor a non-resident. He had "belonged to the industry
the employer to dismiss new employees who do not join the union within
a stated time. A strike to enforce such a provision was declared lawful
in Greenfield v. Central Labor Council, 104 Or. 236, 192 Pac. 783 (1920).
But such an agreement has been held void as in restraint of trade, and
therefore no defense to the union officials, in a suit for damages by a
worker who was discharged at the instigation of union officials because
he did not join the union within the time limit. Curran v. Galen, 152 N. Y.
33, 46 N. E. 297 (1897); Berry v. Donovan, 188 Mass. 353, 74 N. E. 603
(1905).
Is In Barzilay & Harris v. Loewenthal, 134 App. Div. 602, 119 N. Y. Supp.
612 (1st Dept. 1909), the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme
Court reversed an order that the union furnish workers, not otherwise
employed, according to a clause of the agreement, because, among several
reasons, "no one but the employer's association can enforce the agreement
and it is doubtful whether it can be enforced by injunction at all."19 In Shinsky v. Tracey, 226 Mass. 21, 114 N. E. 957 (1917), a union
agent was held liable in damages to a worker who was discharged from
his job after being expelled from the union for joining a rival union. An
injunction was also issued, and the collective agreement was held to be no
defense. The court likened the action of the union to a boycott, adding,
"the right to acquire property by labor is co-equal with the right to
acquire property by contract." To the same effect, see Connors v. Con-
holly, 86 Conn. 641, 86 Atl. 600 (1913); Berry v. Donovan, supra note 17.
But the same worker, being unable to secure employment, was denied a
remedy against union officials because the refusal of employment by the
employer was in support of a valid trade agreement and the acts of union
officials were not malicious. Shinsky v. O'Neil, 232 Mass. 99, 121 N. E.
790 (1919); Hoban v. Dempsey, 217 Mass. 166, 104 N. E. '717 (1914).
An employer was not enjoined from refusing to employ non-union workers
as required by a closed shop agreement in Mills v. United States Printing
Co., 99 App. Div. 605, 91 N. Y. Supp. 185 (2d Dept. 1904), and Kissam
v. United States Printing Co., 199 N. Y. 76, 92 N. E. 214 (1910).
20 In Ryan v. Hayes, 243 Mass. 168, 137 N. E. 344 (1922), an inex-
perienced worker was hired on condition that he join the union. After
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for years both through learning his craft in it and by employ-
ment" and hence "under the agreement he has a right to this
position." 21
The hiring clause, minus the supplementary understandings,
sanctioned the prevailing practices of employers, with the ex-
ception of the limitation upon the privilege of discriminating
on account of union membership. The purpose of this limitation
was obviously to equalize bargaining strength in order that the
agreement might work successfully. This is a valid object when
reached by a trade agreement, but not valid as a legislative
object, enforced by fine or imprisonment.22 A clear case in-
volving only the fact of discrimination on account of union
membership did not arise. It was one of the elements in Cases
455 and 801, one ruling favoring the union, the other the non-
union worker.23
The blacklisting cases involved chiefly the problem of justifi-
able interference with employment by third parties.24 It appears
joining, the union required that he take his turn with other member.
seeking jobs. He was denied damages and an injunction for an alleged
conspiracy on the part of the union to prevent him from obtaining and
holding his job.
21 In Smith v. Bowen, 232 Mass. 106, 121 N. E. 814 (1919), a strike to pre-
vent continued employment of a non-union worker, formerly foreman in
a shop in another city, when competent union workers were unemployed,
was held unjustifiable in the absence of a closed shop clause in the agree-
ment.22 Coppage v. Kansas, supra note 1; Adair v. U. S., 208 U. S. 161, 23
Sup. Ct. 277 (1908); People v. Marcus, 185 N. Y. 257,77 N. E. 1073 (1006).
23 InCase 555 a girl was discharged for repeated tardiness and quarrelling
with other workers. The union claimed discrimination on account of union
membership, but since no evidence supporting this claim was submitted,
the discharge was upheld.
24 The legal treatment of interference with employment by third parties
is unsettled and unsatisfactory, despite the decision of the majority of the
United States Supreme Court in Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell,
245 U. S. 229, 38 Sup. Ct. 65 (1917). The complexity of modern economic
relations, the widening of markets and of competitive influences, and the
rapidly changing customs of associated activity, are some of the factors
that have made it difficult for the courts to protect beneficial relations
between individuals from interference by other individuals and groups.
One source of difficulty seems to be that the courts often cling to the idea
that competition in the "struggle for life" is still between individuals,
whereas, as a matter of fact, individuals nowadays act chiefly as repre-
sentatives of groups, backed by the power of the group.
In general, inducing a breach of contract is held to be actionable. Sayre,
1nducdng Breach of Contract (1923) 36 HARV. L. RE:v. 663, 666. Inducing
the termination of a contract as well is also generally actionable in the
absence of justification. Infra note 37. The arbitration cases mentioned
above are comparable to the cases in which inducing the non-formation
of a contract is actionable if unlawful means be used, or if the motive
is to injure others and not benefit the actor. Strikes, picketing, and boy-
cotts, the common weapons of unions in forcing employers to meet their
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that a worker's access to employment opportunities was pro-
tected from arbitrary and unreasonable interference by other
employers, despite the apparently large scope of the employer's
privilege to discharge at will during the two weeks' probationary
period. Such interference was justifiable if for the purpose of
protecting the common rule of giving a week's notice before
quitting (Cases 64, 115, 119, 139). Otherwise it was "malicious"
in that the interference had no clear relation to legitimate trade
advantages of the employer, and bad policy because it tended
to provoke retaliatory acts on the part of the union (Case 122).
terms, are, of course, interference by third 'parties with the formation of
individual contracts. The difficulty lies in the fact that such activities
always injure others more or less, for they invade the employer's right
of free access to labor and commodity markets, which right the courts
have found it necessary to protect in order to preserve "free competition."
Permissible interference with this right varies greatly in different states.
SAYRE, op. cit. supra note 7, c. 4-10.
The above arbitration cases, which tended to circumscribe the employer's
right to hire whom he pleased and the out-of-town workers' right of access
to employment opportunities in Rochester, involved only peaceable means, i.
e., persuasion. Some courts, however, have enjoined even persuasion not
to enter employment, because it interfered with an employer's right to
unhindered access to the labor market. Sherry v. Perkins, 147 Mass. 212,
17 N. E. 307 (1888); Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 44 N. E. 1077
(1896); Jersey City Printing Co. v. Cassidy, 63 N. J. Eq. 759, 53 At]. 230
(1902); Frank & Dugan v. Herold, 63 N. J. Eq. 443, 62 At]. 152 (1902);
Brennan v. United Hatters, 73 N. J. L. 729, 65 At]. 165 (1906). It is to be
noted that these cases are not very recent. But in Carnes v. St. Paul
Union Stockyards Co., 164 Minn. 457, 205 N. W. 630 (1925), the court
intimated that interference which prevented the formation of employment
contracts might be unlawful unless justified by legitimate trade interests.
In this case the means used were beyond doubt lawful persuasion; the
earlier cases illustrate nicely how much at variance judicial and industrial
concepts of reasonable persuasion and economic coercion often are. In this
connection one may also observe that some courts, following the principle
laid down in American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades' Council,
257 U. S. 184, 42 Sup. Ct. 72 (1921), have so narrowed the privilege of
picketing that the possibilities of inducing by persuasion either the ter-
mination or non-formation of contracts are remote indeed. Jefferson & In-
diana Coal Co. v. Marks, 287 Pa. 171, 134 At]. 430 (1926).
In New York, "assuming a justifiable motive (if that be necessary), it
is not unlawful by persuasion, agreement, and entreaty, accompanied by
picketing, patrolling or spying, to induce a breach of contract, or the ter-
mination or non-formation of contract." Huffcut, Interference with Con-
tracts and Business in New York (1905) 18 HARV. L. REV. 423, 431. But
recent New York cases have held that peaceful picketing which prevents
the formation of employment or commodity contracts may be enjoined.
See Comment (1927) 36 YALE LAW JOURNAL 557. However, in Exchange
Bakery and Restaurant v. Rifkin, -157 N. E. 130, 134 (N. Y. 1927), the
New York Court of Appeals upheld the privilege of peaceful picketing,
reversing the judgment of the Appellate Division, 216 App. Div. 663, 215
N. Y. Supp. 753 (1st Dept. 1926).
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The preference in employment cases involved third party
interference of a different nature. In these cases the union
sought to inter fere with the reciprocal access to the labor market
of employers and actual or alleged out-of-town workers. By
the informal market understanding the union hoped to protect
local workers from the potential or actual competition of out-
of-town workers. In effect, therefore, the parties agreed to a
measure of restiicted access to market opportunities in the in-
terest of a strengthened union and a more or less stabilized
market.25 But the interference with a free flow of labor in and
out of the Rochester market did not, of course, extend to the
point of an absolutely closed market 2r (Case 239), nor a closed
union. The interpretation of the rule justified union interference
with the job opportunities of non-resident workers (Case 230),
those temporarily non-r~sident (and non-union) (Case 455),
and resident apprentices (Cases 584, 602, 692), but not of a resi-
dent worker who happened not to be a union member (Case
801).
II TENURE OF JOBS
(a) Individual discipline. (1) Workers. The discharge clause
of the agreement (Sec. 4) was as follows:
"The power to discharge and suspend employees remains with
the employer, but it is agreed that this power will be exercised
with justice and due regard for the rights of the workers; and if
any worker feels that he has been unjustly treated in the ex-
ercise of this power, he may appeal to the labor adjustment board
hereinafter mentioned, which shall have the power of review in
all such cases."
The understanding about discharges at will during the first
two weeks of employment amounted to a subtraction from this
clause.27 After the probationary period discharges had to be
2SIn Fairbanks v. McDonald, 219 Mass. 291, 106 N. E. 1000 (1914),
the court approved an injuction and damages for interference with em-
ployment by rival unionists. The court said at 297: "In contemplation of
law, they acted from malice towards the plaintiffs, and did to them an
unlawful injury, by causing their exclusion from the labor market."
2 In New York closed shop agreements which amount to a local monopoly
appear to be illegal, but agreements with some, but not all, similar shops in
the locality, are valid. (1924) 2 WIs. L. Rsv. 369. The courts generally
seem to be about evenly divided when the closed shop policy involves a
monopoly of an entire trade, making it difficult for a non-union worher to
get a job. See Comment (1921) 30 YALE Lw JOURNAL 280, 285; SArTX,
op. cit. supra note 24, c. 5; of. Connors v. Connolly, supra note 19; Tracey
v. Osborne, 226 Mass. 25, 114 N. E. 959 (1917).
27As a matter of law, therefore, individual employment contracts during
the two weeks' probationary period were, strictly speaking, hiring at will.
1 WILUSTON, op. cit. supra note 3, § 39.
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justified 8 and were subject to the week's notice rule 2 unless the
offense warranted summary dismissal."
Since the agreement did not specify what were considered
just causes, we have to seek the precise scope of this clause in
the decisions of the arbitrator. We find that a worker was not
to be discharged on account of poor quality of production 31 when
he was not given at least two weeks' fair trial on the new work
(Case 296), when he was old (Case 159), when the shop chair-
man's cooperation in securing improvement was not solicited
(Cases 328, 607, 617, 811), when charges of incompetence were
made after a lay-off to avoid re-employing the worker (Cases
38, 285, 338), when a foreman relied on threat of discharge to
bring about improvement (Cases 318, 582), when the worker
received less than the scale of wages (Cases 88, 148, 159), and
when the worker was not given fair warning of his deficiencies
(Case 38). However, a worker was justifiably discharged for
poor workmanship when he had been given a reasonable trial
(3 months in Cases 161 and 588; 2 weeks in Case 296), or when
he clearly could not do the work for which he was hired (Cases
39, 279, 315).
Similarly a worker was not to be discharged for low produc-
tion when paid less than the scale (Cases 88, 159), when produc-
tion records did not prove the employer's case (Case 384), when
the cooperation of the union was not solicited (Case 617), or
when there was an adequate remedy in measured production
(Case 332). Nevertheless, a worker was justifiably discharged for
low production when production records clearly proved the case
(Cases 315, 588, 617, 645), when an investigating committee
representing both sides agreed a fair day's work for the wages
paid was not being given (Case 153), when the worker deliber-
ately restricted out-put (Cases 325, 463), when the firm had
used reasonable efforts to train the worker (Case 161), or when
the worker was unable to earn even the minimum wage on fair
rates (Cases 617, 645).
28 Such limitations on discharge in collective agreements have not been
controlling unless the individuals concerned expressly contracted in refer-
ence thereto. Hoey v. New Orleans and Great Northern Ry., 159 La. 258,
105 So. 310 (1925); Hudson v. Cincinnati Ry., slpna note 7; cf. Caven v.
Canadian Pacific Railway [1925] 1 D. L. R. 122; (1925) 38 HARV. L, RV.
833.
29 The week's notice rule, being generally known, would probably be con-
trolling in law also. 2 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 3, § 1027.
3 As to what, in the law, constitutes a material breach of duty of servant
to master, justifying discharge, see 2 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 3, §§
1013-1014, 1017-1018, 1020-1022; 1 LABATT, MAST R AND SERVANT (2d ed.
1913) §§ 268, 273-274, 288-299; 39 C. J. §§ 79-90.
31 Compare 2 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 3, § 1014; 1 LABATT, op. cit.
supra note 30, §§ 293-294, on the legal duty to render "diligent and skillful
service."
JOB ANALYSIS
Another group of cases concerned the employer's use of the
discharge privilege in order to maintain shop morale. An em-
ployer was justified in dismissing a man who used physical
violence in the shop (Cases 205, 226, 474), who smoked in the
shop in violation of a clearly understood rule (Cases 35, 422),
who was dishonest (Case 340), who refused to go to the labor
manager to settle a dispute (Case 194), who refused to obey
reasonable orders of the foreman (Cases 35, 232, 422), who
refused to obey orders of foreman and shop chairman (Cases
85, 715), who used indecent language in the shop (Case 83),
who interfered with other workers (Cases 75, 123, 243, 555,
680), or who was repeatedly tardy and quarrelling with other
workers (Cases 75, 555). On the other hand, there was not
sufficient cause for discharge when the smoking rule was not
observed equally by members of the firm (Case 656), when
the actions of the employer were a provocation to the worker
(Cases 205, 257, 270), when "bad times" and the difficulty of
finding another job made discharge for loafing unduly severe
(Case 208), when the worker was comparatively young (Case
130), or when the employer was unable to prove his charges
(Case 215).
Treatment of discharges for absence without notice to the em-
ployer varied according to the circumstances in each case. There
was a market understanding to the effect that the worker must
notify the firm within 48 hours if he wished to retain his job-
privileges. In an early case this understanding was interpreted
by the arbitrator to mean two working days, i. e., the 48 hours
should be reckoned from the time when the worker ordinarily
would have reported for work (Case 27). If a sick worker re-
lied upon a friend to notify the firm, he was liable to discharge
if the friend could not clearly prove notification within the time
limit (Case 147). Yet extenuating circumstances were recog-
nized, as when an employer had recently raised wages despite
irregular attendance (Case 251), or when a worker mistakenly
believed Jewish holidays were excluded from consideration (Case
251), or the long service of employee (seven years) justified
giving him another chance (Case 456). Where there were
reasonable extenuating circumstances, the extreme penalty of
discharge was sometimes modified to suspension (Case 251).
In discharges made necessary by over-manned sections, the
employer was given considerable latitude, provided he exerted
reasonable efforts to keep the excess number of workers em-
ployed, notified the union of over-manned sections, and gave
the union a chance to find other jobs for the displaced workers
(Cases 121, 385, 496, 594).
Similarly, in the cases involving transfers from one job to
another, the worker "has a right to object to a demotion," but
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if the transfer was reasonable, such as to fill out a short-handed
section (Case 442), the worker had no justification for refusing.
However, where the transfer was from week work to piece
work, two periods must be distinguished. Up to May 3, 1921,
the arbitrator protected the worker from being forced to accept
piece work against his will (Cases 38, 193, 228). After that
date, however, the management was given the privilege of trans-
ferring any worker or operation to piece work (General Award,
May 3, 1921 and Case 535), provided the operation was suscept-
ible to measurement (Case 529) and rate and earnings were fair
compared with those in other firms in the market.
Discharges after a lay-off were generally not approved unless
exceptional circumstances could be shown. In one case a worker
was not rehired after a lay-off because his operation was abol-
ished. This was held to be "no just cause for dismissal because
the agreement, while leaving the employer free to change opera-
tions as he sees fit, provides that the worker should not suffer
as a result of such changes" (Case 306). Similar positive obli-
gations were imposed on the employer to teach apprentices, and
an employer was not warranted in discharging an apprentice
if this obligation was not reasonably performed (Cases 98, 739).
Finally, we may note that an employer was not justified in dis-
charging a worker because he exercised his "right" to ask for
increased wages (Case 100) or the minimum wage (Case 752).
Penalties for unjustifiable conduct varied with the seriousness
of the offense and the circumstances of each case. The more
serious offenses, which constituted just cause for discharge (gen-
erally associated with efficiency of production) were penalized
by loss of jobs. Lesser offenses called for suspension for a cer-
tain time or reinstatement without pay for time lost in hearing
the case. Where the employer was wholly unjustified in his
disciplinary action, the worker was reinstated with pay for time
lost, which amounted to an award of compensatory damages
without the worker's duty of mitigation.32
A few striking cases reveal more clearly the process of chang-
ing the working rules by arbitral interpretation. Most of the
32 1n Hoey v. New Orleans Great Northern Railroad Co., mipra note 28,
plaintiff had been discharged in violation of an agreement with his union.
The Railroad Labor Board recommended reinstatement and defendant no-
tified him to return to work, but plaintiff failed to return to work because
of a strike involving his craft. The court held that the plaintiff was
entitled to wages during the period of wrongful discharge until notified to
return to work, the defendant by such notice having accepted the decision
of the arbitration board. In Hudson v. Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas
Pac. Ry. Co., supra note 7, a trade agreement was held not to be a con-
tract upon which the plaintiff could rely in an action for damages for
wrongful discharge in violation of agreement, for the agreement was
merely a memorandum of usages.
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above cases involved the relations of economic opposites acting
as individuals; the union agents appeared as attorneys for the
individual worker as the labor manager represented the em-
ployer. However, in the court reports are many cases involving
relations with economic collaterals (third parties). The fol-
lowing arbitration cases really fall into this class.
Two cases involved the difficult question whether an employer
could be required, under the agreement, to discharge an em-
ployee guilty of an offense against the union.23 The arbitrator
reached opposite conclusions. In Case 149 the grievance com-
mittee of the union disciplined one of its members by a fine and
suspension from the shop where he was worldng. The employer
denied the right of the union to require a firm to discharge an
employee simply because a violation of union rules had occurred.
The union complained that the management was encouraging
its employees to defy the union, but specific charges to this ef-
fect were not made and the arbitrator therefore ruled this
matter out of consideration. On the main question whether the
union could discipline its members by removing them from the
job, the arbitrator said:
"There is no question that the union must have power to dis-
cipline its members. If it cannot do that, then it cannot force
them to live up to agreements made by the union with the em-
ployers. However, in meting out discipline to its members the
union must do it according to the laws of its own organization.-"
33 In the majority of jurisdictions a strike to compel the discharge of
non-union employees is not per se illegal. SAyn, op. cit. supra note 24, at
311 n. and 318, n 1. Massachusetts and New Jersey are conspicuous ex-
amples of the opposite doctrine. Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 57 N. E.
1011 (1900) ; Shinsky v. Tracey, supra note 19; State v. Donaldson, 32 N. J.
L. 151 (1867). But see Jersey City Printing Co. v. Cassidy, s'pra note 24.
34 It is a well settled rule of law that courts will not interfere in the
internal affairs of associations, where a remedy is provided by the asso-
ciation, until that remedy has been exhausted. WRIGIHTIxGTO', Op. cit
supra note 7, § 57; SAYRE, op. cit. supra note 4, c. 14; see Brennan v.
United Hatters, supra note 24 (withdrawal of plaintiff's membership card
held not warranted by the laws of the association and damages awarded
for consequent discharge from job); Reihing v. Local No. 52, Brotherhood
of Electric Workers, 94 N. J. L. 240, 109 Atl. 367 (1920) (withdrawal
of temporary working card, after applicant failed to pass union's entrance
examination, not actionable, even though plaintiff lost job and union had
closed shop agreement with "greater number" of master electricians of
that locality); Malone v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Engine-
men, 94 N. J. L. 347, 110 Atl. 696 (1920) (worker had right to sue for
damages for interference with employment by union which procured his
discharge and prevented re-employment, though the employee had not ex-
hausted his remedies as provided in agreements with railroad administra-
tion) ; Mosshamer v. Wabash Ry. Co., 221 Mich. 407, 191 N. W. 210 (1922)
(court refused to enjoin railway from putting into effect an order of the
union which deprived plaintiff of seniority rights, since the order of the
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It can fine them, reprimand them, suspend or expel them (i. e.,
from the union) and impose any other penalty authorized by
the union's constitution and by-laws which they agreed to obey.
But to make suspension by the employer a penalty imposed by
the union, is going beyond the union's power of discipline and
asking the employer to act in the union's place. The employer
is, therefore, within his rights in refusing to take any such
action . . . it cannot be held that the union has the right
to order the employer to suspend such a member from his job."
In Case 451 a worker was suspended from the union for fail-
ing to pay his dues. The employer refused to discharge the
man at the request of the union, relying on the ruling in Case
149. The arbitrator ruled:
"The dues are the taxes required to maintain the governmental
agencies for the industry set up by the agreement and any indi-
vidual in whose behalf the agreement was signed who avoids the
payment of the tax is violating an obligation assumed by him
when the membership of the union voted to accept the agree-
ment . . . In a previous case (149) it was decided that,
'to make suspension by the employer a penalty imposed by the
union is going beyond the union's power of discipline and asking
the employer to act in the union's place. . . .' In this case the
union has already suspended the erring member before asking for
his discharge and could go no further in disciplining him with-
out striking the shop. . . . Since the agreement ties the
hands of the union in this respect (stoppages), it must afford
to the organization a legal method of enforcing its just discip-
linary measures which will be as effective as the refusal of its
members to work with an expelled member. . . Unless such
a legal method of enforcing disciplinary rules is provided, the
agreement would have the effect of weakening the union, mem-
bers could defy the organization with impunity, and the attempts
of the Labor Adjustment Board to hold the union responsible
for compelling its members to live up to the provisions of the
agreement and to the decisions of the Impartial Chairman would
be futile. . . The union may file a complaint with the em-
ployer that the member has been so suspended, and if the sus-
pension was regular and not in violation of the agreement, it
is the duty of the labor manager to suspend the member from
work until he has obeyed the proper disciplinary measures im-
posed on him. If the labor manager has reason to feel that the
disciplinary action taken by the union has not been regular in
accordance with its own written rules or has been in violation
union was made according to the customs and by-laws of the association) ;
Chambers v. Davis, 128 Miss. 613, 91 So. 346 (1922) (court refused to
enjoin defendants from taking jobs of plaintiffs who were transferred
from the regular to the extra list in accordance with union construction
of seniority clauses in agreement with railway company, because it was
not the "proper function of the courts" to arbitrate disputes between em-
ployees as to relative rights "under their contract with the company,"
there being a vigorous dissent on the ground that the agreement secured
valuable rights which the courts should protect).
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of the agreement, then the labor manager may refuse to suspend
the worker" (until the case is reviewed by the Impartial Chair-
man) .35
In the first of these two cases X (the grievance committee of
the union) penalized Y (a union member) for breach of union
rules by a fine and termination of Y's contract with Z (his em-
ployer). The second half of the penalty, however, could be
imposed only by inducing Z to suspend Y. When Z refused, jus-
tifying himself by the agreement, two courses of action were
open to X: (1) withdraw Y's fellow workers in that shop; or
(2) persuade A (the arbitrator) to construe the agreement so
as to put moral pressure on Z to suspend Y. The first alter-
native of direct action was a clear violation of the agreement ;2
the second alternative failed because X had not exhausted all
the remedies in its power.
In the second case X sought to compel Y to pay his union dues
by suspending him from the union a.zd terminating his contract
with Z. Thus X asked Z to cease dealing with Y as a delinquent
ex-member of the union. When Z refused, A exerted his moral
pressure to make Z conform, using the argument that since X
had given up the alternative of direct action and had exhausted
its own remedies against Y, Z was morally obligated to conform
to X's request. In the one case, inducing the termination of
labor contract was not "lawful," in the second case it was justi-
fied to keep the agreement a going concern and to avoid a direct
violation by the union.37
5 The ruling in this case was incorporated in the 1922-1925 agreement.
Sec. 3: "The employer recognizes the obligation of workers who are mem-
bers of the union, to pay their union dues."
36 This was the alternative adopted in Cases 151-154, infra at 1G1.
7 Just what facts constitute legal justification for inducing the termina-
tion of a contract terminable at will, which would otherwise be actionable,
is not clearly formulated in the cases. Sayre, loc. cit. supra note 24; ibid.
op. cit. supra note 24, c. 4, § 2; Huffcut, op. cit. snpra note 24. For cases
which hold that a trade agreement is a good defense, see Hoban v. Demp-
sey, supra note 19; Tracey v. Osborne, supra note 2G; Mills v. U. S. Print-
ing Co.; Kissam v. U. S. Printing Co., both sztpra note 19; Scarano v.
Lemlein, 66 Misc. 174, 121 N. Y. Supp. 351 (Sup. Ct. 1910) ; Cusumano v.
Schlessinger, 90 Misc. 287, 152 N. Y. Supp. 1081 (1915); Maisel v. Sigman,
123 Misc. 714, 205 N. Y. Supp. 807 (Sup. Ct. 1924); Underwood v. Texas
Pacific Railroad Co., 178 S. W. 38 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915); Uden v.
Schaefer, 110 Wash. 391, 188 Pac. 395 (1920); Harmon v. United Mine
Workers, 166 Ark. 255 (1924). Contra: Berry v. Donovan, avpra note 17;
Smith v. Bowen, supra note 21; Shinsky v. Tracey, supra note 19. Com-
pare with Hitchman Coal and Coke Co. v. Mitchell, smpra note 24; Callan
v. Exposition Cotton Mills, 149 Ga. 119, 99 S. E. 300 (1919); Patterson
Glass Co. v. Thomas, 41 Cal. App. 559, 183 Pac. 190 (1919).
The rule adopted in the leading English cases is that a union official is
justified in interfering with advantageous relations between employers
and employees when acting for union purposes. Allen v. Flood [1898] A.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
It should be noted that X's activity did not deprive Y of all
opportunities for employment in the locality, although, if the
conduct were repeated with each subsequent Rochester employer
of Y, the effect might well have been to drive Y out of the mar-
ket.38 The point of interest in the arbitrator's decision in the
second case is that conformity to the rules of the union is a
legitimate trade interest of all members of the union and justi-
fies interfering with the erring members' vested rights to the
job.
(2) Discipline of Officials. Cases involving discipline of em-
ployers and union officials form a separate group, because the
power of discipline was taken away from the parties directly
concerned and lodged with the arbitrator. The usual method
of union discipline of employers, i. e., stoppage of work, was
taken away by the agreement (Sec. 6). The employer's power
to discipline shop chairmen was transferred by supplementary
understanding to the labor adjustment board, which, in practice,
meant the arbitrator (Sec. 9).
Several cases involved the fitness of a shop chairman who
is the union agent on the job, elected by the workers in the shop.
The earliest (Case 9) arose when a firm refused to reinstate
a shop chairman who had called a shop meeting during work-
ing hours and who had struck a fellow worker. The facts were
admitted by the shop chairman, who entered a plea of self-de-
fense. The arbitrator stated that his offenses were against
his fellow workers for the assault and for loss of time, against
the union for violating union rules, and against the employer
for causing a stoppage of work. "The main responsibility is
on the union to see that men of responsibility and judgment
are selected as shop chairmen." Lacking these qualities, the
worker was removed as shop chairman, though reinstated as a
worker, and the union was ordered to impose a fine of not less
than $10.
In Case 71 a firm complained that a shop chairman fomented a
stoppage to bring pressure on the employer to discharge an in-
experienced off-presser hired in violation of an alleged under-
standing in the shop that off-pressing vacancies would be filled
by promoting under pressers. The arbitrator said it was "quite
evident that the shop chairman did not understand his duties
and that the pressure violated the agreement with the employ-
ers." For this violation the pressers were ordered to make up
the time lost by working overtime at straight pay. As for the
C. 1; South Wales Miners' Federation v. Glamorgan Coal Company [1905]
A. C. 239; Sorrell v. Smith [1925] A. C. 700; cf. Conway v. Wade [1900]
A. C. 506.
38 Unless Y conformed to union rules. Cf. Fairbanks v. McDonald, supra
note 25; Connors v. Connolly, supra note 26.
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shop chairman who "deliberately intended to bring pressure
on the employer by means of a stoppage rather than to take
his complaint up through the union," the arbitrator recom-
mended that the union discipline the shop chairman for neglect
of duty.
In Case 82 a shop chairman was suspended by the labor man-
ager for stirring up trouble in the shop. The shop chairman
counter-charged failure of the management to cooperate. In
the hearing it developed that the shop chairman had transacted
union business during working hours and had insisted on the
discharge of employees whom the firm had a right to employ.
Witnesses for the shop chairman testified to the lack of co-
operation on the part of the management. The arbitrator felt that
there was insufficient cause for discharge, but if the shop chair-
man continued to invade the rights of others, whether of fellow
employees or management, he would be disciplined upon proof
of the charges. Hence he was reinstated without pay for time
lost while suspended.
In Case 111 the fitness of a shop chairman was challenged
on four grounds: (1) He did nothing to prevent stoppages, (2)
refused to let two basters continue work when others stopped
work, (3) spent half a day on a case involving an assistant
foreman, and (4) took up complaints at all hours regardless of
the definite time fixed for such business. After hearing the
evidence the arbitrator ruled:
"It is quite evident that he is too young and too inexperienced
to hold such a responsible position. A shop chairman is an
officer of the union just as much as a business agent or an organ-
izer. It is his duty to tell members they cannot stop working
when the union agreement provides against it. He should know
that it is no part of his business to look after the interests of
assistant. foremen; and when members bring complaints dur-
ing working hours, he should be strong enough to tell them to
come to him at the regular times fixed for receiving complaints."
The arbitrator therefore advised the union that the shop
chairman was unfit for his office and a successor should be
elected.
These early cases pricked out the methods of handling the
discipline of union officials in the shop. Thus in Case 382 the
arbitrator could say: "The rule is well established in the mar-
ket that the labor adjustment board has authority to discipline
a shop chairman and not the labor manager," and, applying that
rule, reinstate a shop chairman who had been suspended for
calling the foreman a liar and refusing to withdraw the remark
or apologize, because evidence showed both sides at fault. Simi-
larly when an employer refused to listen to a shop chairman's
complaints about division of work, he could not have him re-
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moved for ordering a worker not to do certain work in defiance
of the foreman's orders (Case 561). On the other hand a shop
chairman should be removed from office for instigating a stop-
page to force the firm to hire his brother-in-law because, "Shop
chairmen who ask personal favors of a firm show by that fact
that they are unfit for the responsibilities of their position"
(Case 501). In another case a shop chairman took part in a
stoppage caused by the employment of non-union electricians to
install electric fans. No union representatives appeared at the
hearing, whereupon the arbitrator censured both the shop chair-
man and the union for "failing to perform their plain duty under
the agreement." (Case 473).
The offenses of the employer requiring discipline were gener-
ally of three types: (1) insulting union officials; (2) insulting
workers; or (3) flagrant violations of the agreement. Insults
to union officials varied all the way from refusing to deal with
business agents (Case 179) to assaulting a discharged shop
chairman when he came to get his pay (Case 132), and the
penalties varied from a reprimand by the arbitrator (Case 207)
to a $50 fine (Case 220). Similarly where the offense was an
insult to the workers, sometimes involving a walkout of the shop
in protest (Cases 189-190), the penalty was usually a fine, de-
pending on the seriousness of the offense [insult, racy and abus-
ive language (Cases 197, 445), violence and foul language (Case
613)], although in one case (205) a firm was warned that a
repetition of the offense would require the discharge of the
foreman.
For a clear violation of the agreement the penalties had the
elements of a boycott or threatened boycott. Thus in Case 638
a firm sent work to an unregistered contractor, claiming that
this was permissible because this contractor was in the same
building where a registered contractor used to be. The arbi-
trator ruled:
"The excuse offered is too flimsy to be taken seriously. The
firm was ordered to withdraw the work (i. e., from the con-
tractor) immediately and must stop all such subterfuges in the
future for avoiding their responsibilities under the agreement."
Again where a contractor failed to abolish home work, or
pay the minimum wage and time and a half for overtime, he
was ordered to live up to the agreement or be removed from the
list of approved contractors (Case 658). In Case 741 a fine was
imposed for sending models to an unregistered contractor, and
in Case 786 a contractor was removed from the list of registered
shops where work might be sent because he refused to reinstate
a shop chairman when instructed to do so by the arbitrator. Re-
moval or threat of removal from the registered list was a serious
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blow to a contractor's business because of the difficulty of mak-
ing connection with firms outside the Exchange.3
In all these cases the arbitrator, as joint agent of the associ-
ated employers and workers, interfered with the probable ex-
pectancies of union officials, employers, or workers. The extent
of such interference is indicated by the penalties.40 The greatest
interference was undoubtedly that of inducing contractors or
firms to conform by shutting off access to a market (which in
one or two cases may have been actually a breach of contractual
relationship) or threatening to do so.
(b) Group Discipline-Restraints of Direct Action. Lockouts
and stoppages (i. e., strikes) occurred despite the clause of the
agreement (Sec. 6) prohibiting them. In dealing with these
situations the arbitrator worked out certain methods and prin-
ciples which may be illustrated by a few cases.
In Cases 151 and 154 a stoppage occurred as an outgrowth
of the union's attempt to have the finm discharge a worker for
violation of union rules. The union charged the firm's represent-
atives with encouraging defiance of the union. The firm coun-
ter-charged that the shop chairman aided and connived in the
stoppage. The evidence of the union was that at the time of
the stoppage the foreman told the delinquent union worker to
stay at work. This was held to be insufficient evidence to prove
the union's charges, for the employer was merely protecting his
rights. The disposition of the case by the arbitrator is shown
in the following quotation:
"Considering that the agreement between the union and the
manufacturers is about to expire and negotiations are under way
for a new agreement, the Chairman deems it best to leave this
discipline entirely to the discretion of the union."
39 The above situations were not unlike the common boycott. At the in-
stigation of TV (the union), A (the arbitrator) induced E (an employer)
to withdraw or withhold patronage from C (a contractor) until C con-
formed to the sanitary standards and other rules established by the agree-
ment. Insofar as TV, E and A had a common interest and unanimity of
opinion in acting against C, the situation was more like a primary boycott,
which is perfectly legal. Mills v. U. S. Printing Co.; Kissam v. U. S.
Printing Co., both supra note 19; Pierce v. Stablemen's Union, 15G Cal.
70, 103 Pac. 324 (1909). But in most cases E would have continued busi-
ness relations with C if A, at the instigation of TV, had not interfered, and
this situation is comparable with the secondary boycott, which is generally
illegal except in three jurisdictions. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deeing,
254 U. S. 443, 41 Sup. Ct. 172 (1921).
4 0Fines were paid into a fund which, under the administration of the
Labor Adjustment Board, was used for the relief of needy workers in
the market. The question of liquidated damages versus penalty did not
enter. For a case in which the union recovered liquidated damages awarded
by an arbitration board for the employer's breach of the agreement see
Maisel v. Sigman, supra note 37.
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Nevertheless the arbitrator warned that he would:
"impose proper penalties on every worker who takes part in a
stoppage and he will approve the discharge of any shop chair-
man or other individual who causes a stoppage. Shop chairmen
who fail to exert any effort to keep their people at work pending
the adjustment of grievances will be deemed to have encouraged
the stoppage and will therefore be subject to removal."
This case illustrates the flexibility of the system of adjust-
ment presided over by the then Chairman.
In Cases 186 and 187 two basters stopped work, claiming that
the foreman had "indirectly discharged" them by trying to im-
pose unjust conditions after the workers had taken an after-
noon's vacation. The rest of the shop followed, and complaint
was lodged against four individuals for actively instigating the
walkout. The arbitrator's decision was:
"'In regard to the two collar edge basters, the Chairman can-
not recognize such a thing as an indirect discharge. Either the
men refused to work or they were discharged. If the employer
tried to impose unjust conditions on these men it was their busi-
ness to continue to work and file a complaint with their union and
with the Impartial Chairman to have the unjust condition re-
moved. Since they had no faith in the ability of the Union and
the Impartial Chairman to redress their grievances, and instead
chose to use direct action and quitting their jobs, they cannot
expect the Chairman to reinstate them."
As for the rest of the shop, those workers who walked out
blindly were thought to have received sufficient punishment in
wages lost during the time they were out. The four men
charged with special activity were treated as special cases. After
examining the evidence, three of them were shown to have been
active in instigating the stoppage and were discharged.
"This punishment may seem too severe, but information has
come to the chairman that certain people in the shop have ex-
pressed the intention to have another walkout if the decision in
this case, is not to their liking. Under such circumstances there
is no choice except to discharge these three men."
In Case 244 a stoppage occured in a contractor's shop, but
the employer refused to take the workers back when the union
ordered them back to work. The arbitrator refused to hear the
case until the employer reinstated the workers. Thereupon the
employer filed a complaint against all who participated in the
stoppage and particularly against t~vo alleged instigators whom
he wanted to discharge.
Two paragraphs of the arbitrator's ruling deserve quotation
in full:
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"It is admitted by both parties that the stoppage was a viola-
tion of the agreement meriting punishment. But the employer
claimed the right to consider that all who took part in it had
quit their jobs and he could rehire them or not as he pleased,
while the union contended that the employer had no right to
punish them in this manner for that would in effect be a lock-
out which is not justified as a reprisal for a stoppage. The
Chairman is of the opinion that when people take part in a stop-
page they cannot claim a right to their jobs under all circum-
stances. They may or may not be reinstated depending on the
facts in the case as found by the Chairman or by mutual agree-
ment between the employer and the Union.
"A stoppage cannot be considered mere quitting of work for
that involves no violation of the agreement. The employer there-
fore has no right to assume that the people have quit and to re-
hire some while others are left out." He may, however, dis-
charge them all for taking part in the stoppage and in that case
the Union would have the right to request reinstatement on the
ground that the discharge was unjustifiable exactly the same as
in the case of an individual discharge. But it cannot be assumed
that a stoppage automatically acts as a discharge, any more than
it does as a voluntary quitting of work. A stoppage must be
considered a violation of the agreement by the people who take
part in it, and the union must in every case order the people
back to work immediately. In all such cases the employer must
reinstate the people and file a complaint if he cares to, unless he
has notified them and the Union in advance that he wishes to dis-
charge them all for taking part in the stoppage in which case
the Union may appeal to the Chairman to reinstate the people."
Because the employer refused to take the workers back, the
arbitrator was
"of the opinion that the employer as well as the people who
took part in the stoppage have been guilty of violating the agree-
ment. Had the employer taken them back, then he might have
secured redress from the Chairman. As it is the people are
punished by the time they have lost, and the employer has the
loss of production for his violation."
The charges against the two alleged instigators were not
backed by sufficient proof to warrant dismissal, but the arbitra-
tor warned them that repetition of their conduct would justify
discharge.
4 02
41 In Iron Molders' Union v. Allis-Chalmers Co., 166 Fed. 45, 52 (C. C. A.
7th, 1908), Judge Crosscup said: "A strike is cessation of vork by em-
ployees in an effort to get for the employees more desirable terms. A
lockout is cessation of the furnishing of work to employees in an effort to
get for the employer more desirable terms. Neither strike nor lock out
completely terminates, when this is its purpose, the relationship between the
parties." Cf. MARTIN, MODERN LAW OF TrADE UNIONS (1910) ' 58 and
cases cited.
42Compare the situation in the above case with that in Mechanics Foun-
dry and Machine Co. v. Lynch, 236 Mass. 504, 128 N. E. 877 (1920), where
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In Cases 192 and 196 a dispute arose over standards of produc-
tion for off-pressers. The employer threatened dismissal if his
demands were not granted; whereupon the pressers walked out4
This was the old way of bargaining. The arbitrator said:
"If either the employer or the men had followed the procedure
provided by the agreement, the Chairman would penalize the
one that was in the wrong and give redress to the other.
Since they thought they could do better by taking the law into
their own hands, the Chairman cannot help them now. The loss
of time and loss of production should serve as a lesson for the
future."
Similarly when a section stopped work because it did not like
the firm's price offer, "a stoppage is not justified as a method of
getting a proper price 4 any more than a lockout would be justi-
fied when the workers ask a price that the employer considers
too high." (Case 294) .4 Hence the union was requested to im-
a strike to compel reinstatement of a discharged employee was declared
illegal.
431n Schlesinger v. Quinto, supra note 16, the union obtained an injunc-
tion against an employer's breach of an agreement which established the
week work system in place of piece work.
44A stoppage to obtain higher wages than those stipulated in the agree-
ment, as modified by an arbitration award, was involved in Nederlandsch
Amerikaansche Stoomvaart Maatschappij (Holland-American Line) v.
Stevedores' and Longshoremen's Benevolent Society, 265 Fed. 397 (E. D.
La. 1920). The employer recovered damages for breach of contract (col-
lective agreement). The union, however, was incorporated. This decision
illustrates one reason for the opposition of unions to incorporation and also
for the fairly general feeling among unionists that trade agreements are,
or should be, only morally binding, not enforceable at law. Originally
many unions were inclined to Tavor incorporation, but this is no longer
generally true. They fear that incorporation will make it easier for
employers to get at union funds. Moreover the mere act of incorporation
does not eliminate the difficulty experienced by union leaders in controlling
the acts of individual members in trade disputes. The prevailing legal
doctrine has been that unincorporated associations, like unions, may not be
sued in the common name in the absence of a statute authorizing such
suits, although a different rule is frequently applied in equity. St. Paul
Typothetae v. St. Paul Bookbinders Union No. 37, 94 Minn. 351, 102 N. W.
725 (1905). That this doctrine may be discarded by the courts on their
own motion is shown by the opinion of the United States Supreme Court in
United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U. S. 344, 42 Sup. Ct. 570
(1922). The trend of legal opinion seems to be definitely in the direction
of holding unincorporated unions suable in their common names. Under
this doctrine service of process on the chief official of the union would be
sufficient to "authorize judgment and execution against common property."
Sturges, Unincorporated Associations as Parties to Actions (1924) 33
YALE LAW JOURNAL 383.
4 Compare the result achieved in Maisel v. Sigman, supra note 37, with
that in Schwartz v. Wayne Circuit Judge, 217 Mich. 384, 186 N. W. 522
(1922), and Schwartz v. Cigar Makers International Union, 219 Mich. 589,
189 N. W. 55 (1922).
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pose a fine because the usual penalty of making up lost time by
working overtime at straight pay was impracticable in the busy
season. In a number of stoppages for all manner of purposes,
from getting better prices or preventing certain workers from
getting jobs to forcing personal privileges (Case 501), the arbi-
trator applied the principle that the party desiring redress must
come "into court with clean hands" (Cases 302-303). Penalties
variously applied were: (1) Workers ordered to make up lost
time by working overtime at straight pay; (2) Workers ordered
to pay fines varying from 50c to $2 per worker; (3) Workers
suffered loss of wages for duration of stoppage; (4) Discharge
of workers involved; (5) Shop chairman removed from office;
and (6) Workers involved, and union, censured by arbitrator. In
the case of lockouts, the employer was penalized by denial of
rights of redress, loss of production during stoppage or lockout,
or censure by the arbitrator.
Three stoppage cases involving more complicated facts deserve
special consideration. In Cases 749-751 intermittent stoppages
occurred for obscure reasons, the most definite of which appeared
to be the arbitrator's decision fixing a new standard of produc-
tion for off-pressing. On the first day the whole shop walked
out; on the second day the off-pressers stopped work, and they
in turn were followed by the second basters. The firm refused
to reinstate the basters, and when the off-pressers refused to ac-
cept this discrimination in favor of themselves, the firm refused
to reinstate the pressers. The firm, having in effect discharged
the basters and pressers, petitioned the arbitrator to impose some
lesser penalty on the rest of the shop for walking out the first
day. In this state of facts we find the following offenses: (1)
stoppage of the pressers to coerce a more favorable decision from
the arbitrator; (2) sympathetic strike by the basters in support
of the pressers, (3) by the pressers against discharge of the
basters, and (4) by the rest of the shop in support of the pres-
sers.
The arbitrator's opinion was substantially:
"Such procedure as this of the firm's will not only fail to pre-
vent stoppages but will unintentionally bring the agreement and
the impartial machinery into contempt. The most serious offense
was that of the off-pressers, for they violated not only the agree-
ment but a specific decision affecting themselves. For tlis the
firm did not think best to impose discharge as a penalty but did
try to impose it on the basters for the less serious offense of
stoppage in violation of the agreement alone."
-fter penalizing three of the offenses on its own responsibil-
ity, the firm then asked a lesser penalty for the remainder of the
shop.
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"The whole series of events should make clear the impractica-
bility of varying the methods of procedure in dealing with and
preventing stoppages... The impartial machinery will be inef-
fective in such matters if it is used only when smaller penalties
are desired by a firm but is excluded from the procedure when
the extreme penalty of discharge is to be imposed. Still less can
the Chairman be effective if a firm chooses to impose the extreme
penalty for stoppage alone but not for stoppage plus disregard
of the Chairman's decision. In this case the firm's actions,
though not so intended, threaten to bring the machinery into
contempt. Consequently the firm's method of securing penalties
must be be entirely discarded."
The arbitrator ordered reinstatement of pressers and basters,
who were fined $2 apiece.
In Cases 798-804 a section of sleeve sewers was discharged by
a firm after a stoppage due to a grievance and an altercation
with the foreman and labor manager. The latter informed the
union that he did not want to take the men back. Nevertheless
the union brought the men back and tried to persuade the firm
to reinstate them. This was refused, the firm stating that the
workers were discharged for walking out in violation of the
agreement. The firm then tried to hire new sleeve sewers through
the union and by approaching individuals, but without success.
Four days after the stoppage the firm filed a complaint "against
action resulting in a boycott." Due to illness of various persons
a hearing was not held until eight days after this complaint."
The union counter-charged unjust dismissal, though it admitted
that the boycott was effective because the discharged sleeve
sewers "merely by talking of their grievance" kept "other sleeve
sewers from taking the job." ,"
The arbitrator ruled that the sleeve sewers had doubly violated
the agreement in stopping work and in not taking their griev-
ance to the adjustment board.
"Practice as well. as specific decision of the Chairman (Case
244) has recognized that discharge might be imposed by an em-
ployer for such violations. But such procedure sooner or later
was sure to lead to such a situation as in this case, . . Whether
the stoppage was sufficient ground for discharge or not, the
4 This was an unusual delay in disposing of a complaint, except, of
course, general wage adjustments. Compare procedural delays in the law
as illustrated in injunction cases and damage suits. An extreme case
is that of the United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., supra note 44,
in which the original complaint was filed in September 1914 and all phases
of the case are not yet finally litigated. Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine
Workers, 268 U. S. 295, 45 Sup. Ct. 551 (1925). The longest period be-
tween a temporary restraining order and a final injunction was six years
in the Hitchman case.
47 Compare recent New York Supreme Court cases holding that peaceful
picketing in the absence of a trade dispute is unlawful. See Comment
(1927) 36 YALE LAW JOURNAL 557.
JOB ANALYSIS
double violation requires such a reprimand as only a discharge
will give. All these sleeve sewers are discharged and both the
Union and the firm are to cooperate in carrying out this deci-
sion so that the incident shall be closed."
In this case we have the common form of direct action to pre-
vent the formation of contracts which has troubled and divided
the courts in picketing and strike cases. Yet there was no evi-
dence of malicious, in the sense of intentional, injury. The
sleeve sewers very naturally aired their grievances and the ef-
fect of this was a labor boycott. But who can say, from the facts
as stated, whether the boycott was a matter of design or con-
spiracy or merely the incidental effect of normal human be-
havior? If it were proved that the union deliberately refused
to send alternative workers to this firm unless the firm rescinded
the discharges of the sleeve sewers, the employer might reason-
ably claim that the boycott was, in legal terminology, a con-
spiracy.
The third stoppage case involved both the sympathethic strike
and the secondary labor and materials boycott. In addition it
probably went to the "verge of the law" if not beyond, as the
agreement was then understood, because it involved interference
with the exclusive province of management to solicit and carr
out commodity contracts.
In Cases 327-335 the cutters stopped work, claiming that the
film was doing strike work from New York, where a lockout
and strike involving members of the Amalgamated was being
carried on. The arbitrator ordered the cutters to return to
work pending investigation, because "a stoppage is not justified
merely because the workers think such work is being done." The
employers, speaking through legal counsel, raised the ques-
tion whether the Impartial Chairman had jurisdiction over the
union's complaint."8 This question was answered affirmatively
by the arbitrator.
"The underlying principle of the agreement is that any griev-
ance of the workers will be heard and decided in accordance with
the rules laid down in the agreement, and only the Impartial
Chairman has authority to decide whether a question is covered
by the agreement or not. The agreement says that all disputes
arising under the agreement shall be submitted to arbitration
and there is no doubt that a stoppage because the workers think
they are asked to work on goods for a house where there is a
lockout or a strike is a dispute arising under the agreement.
The Chairman is therefore of the opinion that it is his duty to
determine the fact whether the work in question is really of
4- It will be recalled that under the Rochester agreement the decision of
the arbitrator as to jurisdiction was final. Supi'a note 4.
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this character and the agreement gives him authority to make
decisions in all such cases." 49
Having taken jurisdiction of the dispute, even though it in-
volved the selling policy of a firm, the arbitrator faced two
questions: (1) What does the agreement require if this was
"strike work?"; (2) Was the work in question "strike work?"
On the first question the arbitrator held:
"It can not be assumed, that when this union signed the agree-
ment it entered into any arrangement which would compel its
members to work for its own destruction. When employers in
this or in other cities are engaged in a fight with the union, the
members of the union can not be expected to do the work for
those employers with whom the union is fighting and so help to
destroy their own national organization which is a party to the
agreement in Rochester. The members of the Clothiers' Ex-
change were well aware of this when the present agreement was
entered into, and it must be held that the agreement reserves
49 The willingness of the arbitrator to assume jurisdiction over an ap-
parently borderline case may be compared with the similar attitude of
courts toward disputes arising under collective agreements. For example,
compare the majority and dissenting opinions in Chambers v. Davis, supra
note 34, and the opinion in Hudson v. Cincinnati Ry., supra note 7, with
thq opinions in Maisel v. Sigman, supra note 37, and Hoey v. New Orleans
Ry., supra note 28. The trend of judicial opinion, particularly in Now
York, seems to be in the direction, on one ground or another, of construing
trade agreements as contracts and consequently of giving remedies in
disputes arising thereunder. See Clark, Collective Bargaining in the United
States of America (1927) 15 INTERNATIONAL LABOUR REV. 197; Clark,
Legal Effect of Collective Agreements (1921) 12 MONTHLY LABOR REv.
416; Fuchs, Collective Labor Agreements in American Law (1925) 10 ST.
Louis L. REv. 1.
One may well surmise how the courts would have treated this assump-
tion of jurisdiction by the arbitrator if, as a result of this award, either
party to the agreement had sought to test its validity by legal action. The
awards under the Rochester agreement fall within the classification of
common law arbitration. If the collective agreement is construed as a
contract and is also construed to cover such disputes as the one involved in
Case 327 above, the common law doctrine is clear and of long lineage that
such an award will be enforced barring other faults. 5 C. J. §§ 389, 565
ct seq.
Illustrating the judicial treatment of arbitration awards in pursuance of
a collective labor agreement are the following cases: Mastell v. Salo, 140
Ark, 408, 215 S. W. 583 (1919); Maisel v. Sigman, supra note 37, with
which may be compared Gregg v. Starks, 188 Ky. 834, 224 S. W. 459
(1920) ; Chambers v. Davis, supra note 34; Malone v. Brotherhood of Loco-
motive Firemen and Enginemen, supra note 34; Hoey v. New Orleans R. R.,
supra note 28. In the Hoey case the arbitration board was authorized
by statute. In the Gregg and Malone cases the railway board of adjust-
ment functioned under authority of the Director-General of Railroads,
who, in turn, derived his authority from an Act of Congress. Presumably,
therefore, the arbitration decisions in these cases were not awards in the
common law sense.
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the right to members of the union not to work on any so-called"strike work." -o
On the second question both sides submitted their evidence
and the Chairman himself made an investigation of the facts.
The employers presented evidence
"to show that it is a bona fide retail order for a retail chain
of stores which has always bought goods in Rochester and in
other markets besides getting a good deal from the New York
manufacturer who has an interest in these stores. The Exchange
contends that its members make goods for retailers and as long
as this order is from a retailer for goods to be sold in the
stores and not for the manufacturer whose people are locked
out or on a strike, this can not be considered 'strike work'."
The union contended "that the chain of retail stores is oper-
ated merely as a department of a manufacturing firm in New
York which has locked out members of the Amalgamated from
its shops and which, it is charged, has openly stated that its
purpose is to destroy the union... and that goods and patterns
were shipped up by this house" to the Rochester firm.
The arbitrator's investigation 51 disclosed
51 The privilege of union members to refuse to work on "strike wor:" and
to strike rather than do so was upheld in Iron Molders' Union v. Allis-
Chalmers Co., supra note 41. Cf. Pacific Typesetting Co. v. Typographical
Union, 125 Wash. 273 (1923), in which the fact that plaintiff's worl:v.v-s not
"strike work," in a strict sense, was a material point in the court's deci-
sion to award damages against the union.
5 Independent investigation by the arbitrator was a not uncommon
method of getting at the relevant facts of a dispute. The methods of
finding facts varied with the circumstances of the case. If the adequacy
of a rate for a particular operation was disputed, the arbitrator might go
into the shop and observe the operation himself; he might appoint an
investigating committee composed of representatives of employers and
workers not directly involved in the controversy; he might informally
ask the opinion of foremen or production supervisors in other firms, or
of union agents or shop chairmen who had worked or were working on the
operation in question. In cases 327435 the arbitrator happened to be a
former arbitrator in the New York market and hence knew something of the
surrounding circumstances. In any event the arbitrator was not obligcd to
rely solely on the facts brought in evidence by the parties to the immediate
dispute as in the case in court proceedings.
In People v. Epstean, 102 Misc. 476, 170 N. Y. Supp. 68 (Ct. Gen. Sezs.
1918), which involved the validity of a uniform price list for photo-en-
graving under the New York anti-trust statute, the judge, at the suggestion
of the parties, visited a shop and watched the process of making a photo-
engraving plate. He reached the conclusion that "photo-engraving is not a
commodity," within the scope of the statute, but "is rather to be regarded
as an art or process, . . . work, labor and services." It is at least a
reasonable inference from the opinion that the judge came to this con-
clusion mainly as a result of his personal investigation. Compare Standard
Engraving Co. v. Volz, 200 App. Div. 758, 193 N. Y. Supp. 831 (lst Dpt
1922), in which a strike to force employers to conform to a union rule
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"that piece goods were sent up by the retail stores which evi-
dently came from the New York manufacturer... No patterns
were sent in this way, but a coat or two were sent up as models
for the order... The chain of retail stores is a separate corpora-
tion with different officers and directors from the New York
manufacturing firm but this firm does have a financial interest
in the corporation."
The arbitrator therefore ruled:
"In view of these facts the employer had justification for as-
suming that he was taking a bona fide order from a retailer.
On the other hand the fact that the retailer received piece goods
from the New York manufacturing house which has an interest
in the retail stores and which has offices in the same building
with the offices of the retail corporation raises the suspicion
-that some of the finished goods might be turned over to the same
manufacturer; and if that happened the union members would
have a right to' refuse to do this work. In order to avoid any
difficulty in this regard and the strikes and stoppages which
might result from it, the Chairman is of the opinion that the
workers should finish out whatever work has already been cut,
provided the rest is sent back and they are required to do no
more of it." 52
In other words, if A (a manufacturer) is engaged in a dispute
with B (a union), the members of B, wherever located, are justi-
fied in refusing to work for C (an employer operating under an
agreement with B) on goods destined for D (a retailer having
financial relations with A), in order to coerce A to conform to
the demands of B. Moreover this refusal of B to work for C is
justified in the absence of an overt act showing that A will bene-
fit directly from the contract between C and D. The justification
rests on the broad ground of the common interest of all members
of B, by whomever employed, in the struggle between A and the
New York members of B. 2 The action of the Rochester mem-
bers of B was a sympathetic strike against C in order to break
a contract between C and D which might in the future have
directly benefited A. If A had no financial interest in D, the sit-
uation would clearly have been that of a secondary boycott,
which was, in effect, the argument of C. In view of the financial
establishing a minimum base price for photo-engraving was hold to have
been properly enjoined. In this case the opinion of the court dealt almost
entirely with legal rules of statutory construction.
52 This decision, with others, led to the narrowing of the arbitrator's
jurisdiction in the 1922-1925 agreement, supra note 5. The reason for this
restriction appears to be that of protecting the arbitrator against having
to make decisions on basic industrial policy for which the parties them-
selves should accept full and mutual responsibility. SEVENTh BIENNIAL
REPORT OF GENERAL EXECUTIVE BOARD OF AMiALGAMATED CLOTHING WVORIC-
E R (1926) 25-27.
53 Cf. Justice Holmes' dissenting opinion in Vegelahn v. Guntner, supra
note 24, at 107.
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relationship, the situation was practically that of a primary
boycott. If this financial connection between D and A were
absent or overlooked, the union would have accomplished by
means of the agreement and the adjustment machinery in Roch-
ester what the United States Supreme Court declared illegal in
the Duplex case.
4
(c) Lay-Off azd Pernunent Reduction of Force. The above
cases illustrate the tendency under the Rochester agreement to
establish for the worker certain vested rights in his job. These
rights were protected by the arbitrator against unjustified in-
vasions by immediate or possible employers, by employers or
workers outside the agreement, and by fellow-workers. The
object was to promote efficiency and orderly adjustment of dis-
putes by making the worker feel that his job was secure and his
future expectations reasonably certain, The agreement was
in no sense, however, a guarantee of continuous employment.
Irregular employment was a risk, proceeding from fluctuations
in commodity markets, which affected not only the tenure of the
job, but also the certainty of earnings on the job; yet the agree-
ment contemplated only the prevention of discrimination, favor-
itism and unequal treatment in the adjustment of vested job-
rights to this risk.
The cases in which these situations arose group themselves
under the two headings of lay-off and permanent reduction of
force. The agreement (Sec. 7) specified that during slack times
work should be divided equally among all workers "as far as
practicable." 56 In some instances workers demanded a particu-
lar method of dividing the work, but the arbitrator held that the
54Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, supra note 39.
55 The same aim underlay the adjustment of disputes regarding earnings
on the job, though the protection of earnings was more a matter of stand-
ardization, i. e., the application of the formula "equal pay for equal effort,"
with some adjustment of earnings levels to accomplish other purposes
(such as equalization with other competing markets, standard of living,
discouragement of home work). The wage cases are too numerous to sum-
marize here. See Morehouse, Development of Industrial Law in the Ro-
chester Clothing Market (1923) 37 QuA,. J. or Ec. 257.
s In Minasian v. Osborne, 210 Mass. 250, 96 N. E. 1036 (1911), a strike
to abolish a system of helpers which resulted in unequal division of work
during slack periods was not enjoined. In National Association of Window
Glass Manufacturers v. U. S., 263 U. S. 403, 44 Sup. Ct. 148 (1923), an
agreement to divide factories into two groups and operate each only dur-
ing certain periods of the year did not constitute an unreasonable restraint
of trade. In Benito Rovira Co. v. Yampolsky, 187 N. Y. Supp. 894 (Sup.
Ct. 1921), the plaintiff laid off men and the defendant, representing a
committee of the plaintiffs employees (no union was involved), told plain-
tiff that the workers would strike unless all were retained or worl was
divided equally. The court ruled that the strike was illegal and should ba
enjoined.
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employer was privileged to arrange the division to suit his pro-
duction requirements so long as each worker received an equal
share (Case 288). But the employer could not divert work from
one individual to another (Cases 295 and 623). Yet if one
worker lost half a day mot'e than the others on his operation, he
had no complaint.
"As the agreement provides for equal division of work 'so
far as practicable' the slight difference in the case of this man
comes within the differences arising from considerations of prac-
ticability" (Case 723).
Moreover the union could not invoke the equal division of
work principle during busy seasons against the reduction of an
overmanned section, for that would lead to a permanent over-sup-
ply of labor (Case 385).
In some instances particular employers guaranteed their em-
ployees against a lay-off 57 and disputes arose concerning the ap-
plication of these special agreements. In one case (51) such an
agreement was claimed by the workers as justifying payment for
time lost. The arbitrator could find no certain evidence of the
existence or terms of such an agreement, but required the em-
ployer to pay for time lost because he laid off the whole shop to
avoid paying for the idle time. In another case a verbal agree-
ment to pay for idle time was proved to exist (Case 55). The
workers claimed this required paying for idle time when laid
7 On the legal duty of the employer to furnish work, see 2 WILLISTON,
op. cit. supra note 3, § 1015; 26 Cyc. 1017 and cases cited. Under a term
contract there appears to be often an implied legal duty to furnish work
(or compensation) for the term of the contract, omitting such complica-
tions as impossibility of performance due to bankruptcy. Under a contract
at will there is no such obligation. Where payment is by the piece, the
law recognizes no such duty unless it is expressly stipulated, or the custom
of the industry clearly requires the employer to furnish work or pay for
idle time. Texas Central R. R. v. Newby, 41 S. W. 102 (Tex. Civ. App.
1897).
In Schwartz v. Wayne Circuit Judge, and Schwartz v. Cigar Makers
International Union, both supra note 45, the plaintiffs were cigar manu-
facturers who had been operating under a union agreement. The union
agreed to a cut in wages in return for an agreement by the employers
"to furnish employment to their shop capacity for a year" to members
of the union only. Instead, the plaintiff hired some 200 non-unionists and
when a strike ensued to enforce compliance with the agreement, the plain-
tiff asked for an injunction restraining picketing, interference, etc. The
union filed a cross-bill asking an injunction restraining the breach of the
agreement. The union's request was denied and an injunction granted
to the employers. "In the instant case the practical effect of the decree
(i.e., for the union) is to control the conduct of the business of the plain-
tiff . . ." Compare Blum & Co. v. Landau, 155 N. E. 154 (Ohio 1926),
in which an employee recovered wages due under an unemployment in-
surance clause of a collective agreement.
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off through no fault of their own -; the employer claimed that
such payment was due only when the lay-off was the fault of
employer. In this instance, the absence of 5 out of I& button-
hole makers caused the lay-off of the other workers. The arbi-
trator ruled that since neither party anticipated situations like
this, the verbal agreement should not hold. But "it is the re-
sponsibility of management to keep a regular flow of work going
through the shop and absences constitute one of the difficulties
that management must calculate in advance on overcoming."
However, the Chairman expressed the belief that as a matter of
managerial policy, the workers should be paid for time lost be-
cause the verbal agreement was made to reassure employees that
they would not be working themselves out of jobs by increasing
or maintaining production early in the season, and because it
was desirable to avoid giving them this impression. 0
But there is a vast difference between temporary separation
from the opportunity to work and a permanent separation, such
as occurs in permanent reductions of force. When only one
section is involved, the difficulties in finding other jobs with the
same or other firms are not so great. But when the entire shop
is abandoned because it is unprofitable the difficulties are much
greater. Two decisions will illustrate how these situations vere
dealt with.
In Case 594 ten cutters were given a week's notice of dis-
charge on account of permanent reduction of force. The arbitra-
tor held that, instead of immediate discharge, work should be
divided until the union found jobs for the surplus cutters, who
were to be the first source of supply to the union. In Case 698
a firm's announcement that one of its shops would be closed
indefinitely was charged with being a violation of the spirit and
letter of the agreement. The arbitrator ruled:
"The issues in this case are not covered by the letter of the
agreement but by" the unwritten understandings and established
58 Compare Illinois Central R. R. v. Baker, 155 Ky. 512, 119 S. W. 1169
(1913), in which miners who had been laid off by a mining company on
account of negligence of the railroad in failing to supply the company with
cars (for which negligence the mining company obtained damages from the
railroad) sought unsuccessfully to recover damages from the railroad for
wages lost during lay-off.
z In Moody v. Model Window Glass Co., 145 Ark. 197, 224 S. W. 430
(1920), the court upheld the employees' claim under a national agreement
for wages while waiting for work. Cf. Mastell v. Salo, cztra note .19
(worker recovered wages awarded by arbitration under agreement, though
worker was uninformed as to his rights in the matter until agents of his
union took up his case); Gulla v. Barton, 164 App. Div. 293, 149 N. Y.
Supp. 952 (3d Dept. 1914) (worker recovered difference between wages
paid by employer and wages due under agreement with union). See also
Keysaw v. Dotterweich Brewing Co., 121 App. Div. 58, 105 N. Y. Supp.
562 (4th Dept. 1907).
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practices of the market. These have recognized employers' rights
to a permanent reduction of force, to close down a shop and to
enlarge a shop; 1o and the employees rights to preference in em-
60 The right or privilege of an employer to close down an unprofitable
shop was involved in two recent cases. In Welinsky v. Hillman, 185 N. Y.
Supp. 257 (Sup. Ct. 1920), the Amalgamated Clothing Workers had struck
to compel an employer to continue the manufacturing department of his
establishment, which he had determined to abandon. Plaintiff asked for
an injunction restraining the strike. This was granted on the ground
that the strike was unjustified "coercion in support of a demand which the
employees had no right to make." The court said: "I am not insensible
to the hardship to old employees thus suddenly thrown out of work, or of
the loyalty of their fellow workers, who seek to come to their rescue;
but I see no justification under the law for their present attempt, or the
attempt of their union, to compel the plaintiff to continue their employment.
Such situations may very well suggest doubts and problems to the student
of social science; but in the present state of our law, which is adapted to
prevailing conceptions of individual rights, I think there is no doubt about
the decision which must be given here." A similar situation was involved
in Maisel v. Sigman, supra note 37, in which the plaintiff resigned from
the employer's association in order to reorganize his business, eliminating
much of the "inside manufacturing" which was controlled by agreement
between the union and the employer's association. After a strike, a now
agreement was made, including arbitration and liquidated damage clauses
and restrictions on the employer's tendency to contract out his work. For
breach of this agreement and refusal to abide by an arbitration award, the
union recovered liquidated damages.
In Rutan Co. v. Local No. 4, Hatters' Union of America, 97 N. J. Eq.
77, 128 Atl. 622 (1925), the plaintiff found that his "making shop" was
unprofitable and that he could purchase hats "in the rough" cheaper than he
could make them. He therefore closed down the shop and discharged the
workers. The employees in the finishing shop of the same firm struck in
sympathy. Plaintiff asked for an injunction, claiming that the strike was
for the purpose of forcing him to re-open the abandoned shop. The
defendant union claimed that the strike was in pursuance of their own
interests as expressed in a union by-law that no manufacturer should be
given a union label who had a "making shop" and bought hats in the
rough, unless the making shop was run to capacity. The opinion of the
court is interesting. " .. . if . . . the purpose of a strike is, and as the
complainant contends it is here, to compel an employer to run his shop
against his will, and to his injury re-employ his discharged hands, for
whom he has no use, then the strike is unlawful, for the union has no right
to prevent employers of labor from profitably prosecuting their business."
Yet the court found that the proof in this case did not show such unlawful
purpose, although admitting that the plaintiff "may have to re-establish its
plank shop, i.e., making shop, or go out of business altogether." " . . . for
such misfortune the members of the union disclaim responsibility, and
rightly. They were not under contract to work; they have done nothing
more than refrain from working; they have not prevented the complainant
from procuring others to take their places, and none of the usual strike
tactics has been resorted to to deter others from taking their places, nor
have they in any way interfered with the complainant in the carrying on
of its business in its own way. In fine, their attitude has been simply one
of hands off and let the complainant get along as best it may without them.
This attitude is not open to judicial criticism."
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ployment by firms for which they have worked ... except as lim-
ited by the permanent reduction of force... These preferential
rights apply primarily to the same or similar operations as those
performed in the old shop, and a former employee in Shop No. 3
is to be in no sense a new employee or on probation in the rest
of the plant when given a position at his former operation. If
an employee is offered and accepts a position on an entirely new
operation, he may be treated as on probation on the new work.
If he fails to make good he by no means loses his preferential
rights to a position on his original operation when open." cl
(d) Introduction of Machinery. The tenure of the job was
threatened, of course, by every change in managerial policy, but
changed methods of manufacturing constituted the most serious
threat of all. The introduction of machinery tended not only to
displace the worker from a particular job but also to destroy the
skill, acquired through long experience, which was the chief as-
set of the worker claiming a favorable differential in wages.
The agreement specified in Section 5:
"The right of the employer to make changes in shop manage-
ment and methods of manufacturing is recognized, such changes
to be made without loss to the employees directly affected."
In the situations that arose, the difficulty was to protect this
right of the progressive employer while at the same time pro-
tecting the worker's skill and job. Two cases only need be cited
to show how the arbitrator construed the phrase "without loss
to the employees directly affected."
In Case 346 an employer introduced new machinery which
split the off-pressing operation into several parts. Hitherto off-
pressing had been done entirely by hand and was considered the
most skilled of the pressing operations. The union complained
that the machines were improperly introduced and that the
change should not have been made because the off-pressers' sldll
was thereby taken away. The employer's argument against the
union's first complaint was that the shop was new and al the
pressers could not be called to work at once, and that all the
pressers and the shop chairman knew the machines were in the
shop and were openly told of the proposed change in work. Evi-
dence showed that the pressers worked from three to six weeks
without complaint, so that, while the matter was not tactfully
handled by the employer, the shop chairman knew of the new
methods and therefore could not complain of improper induce-
ment.
As to seniority rights under a trade agreement after a layoff, see
Mosshamer v. Wabash Ry. Co., supra note 34; Dickinson v. Brotherhood
of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, unreported case, District court,
2nd Judicial District, Division 3, City and County of Denver, Colo. (1925).
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The arbitrator ruled that there could be no dispute as to the
right of the manufacturer to introduce new machinery provided
the workers did not suffer thereby, saying:
"There is a certain amount of loss of skill from this splitting
of the operation but that is inevitable and in place of it the
worker gains the efficiency that comes from specialization."
Furthermore other operations in the market had been divided,
and the pressers in this house were not entitled to special con-
sideration or a favored position in the market.
The skill of the worker may be taken away in the interest of
industrial progress. But an employer may not invoke the right
to change manufacturing policies as a cloak for the arbitrary
displacement of workers from jobs (Case 306) ; he should main-
tain earnings and keep the worker on the job until another place
can be found for him by the employer or the union.
RELATION OF THE LAW TO EXTRA-JUDICIAL PROCESS
Flexibility was the outstanding characteristic of the system
of "industrial jurisprudence" G2 worked out in the Rochester
clothing market. The terms of the trade agreement were adapted
by both parties and the arbitrator to the circumstances of each
case. There were no rigid rules regarding admissibility of evi-
dence or the weight to be attached to particular facts. Any rele-
vant facts could be introduced by either party and the arbitrator
could ask for or seek additional facts on his own initiative.2
Procedure was informal; the jurisdiction of the arbitrator was
broad; he was in close daily contact with the technical problems
involved and with the persons charged with administering the
agreement. The interplay of personalities-the psychological
element which is so important a part of employer-employee rela-
tions-in short, the "industrial politics" 04 of the market could
thus be taken into account in finding a workable solution of dis-
putes. Finally, one may note the adaptability of the sanctions
at the arbitrator's disposal 0; to the practical requirements of
02 Ernst, The Development of Industrial Jurisprudence (1921) 21 COL. L.
REV. 155.
63 A court of law relies, almost necessarily, on the facts brought out by
counsel who are themselves playing the game according to rules of law.
Even when the lawyers seek to bring pertinent industrihl facts to the
court's attention, it is often difficult to get them into the record. Rules of
evidence and of pleading, interpreted by the court, are frequently insur-
mountable obstacles. Examine the history of Michaels v. Hillman, 111 Misc.
284, 181 N. Y. Supp. 165 (Sup. Ct. Sp. T. 1920) ; 112 Misc. 395, 183 N. Y.
Supp. 195 (Sup. Ct. Tr. T. 1920).
64 As in Cases 151, 154, supra at 161.
65 As in the stoppage cases, sura at 161 et seq.
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each situation." Although certain remedies came to be applied
to certain types of wrongs, there were no hard and fast rules
governing the use of penalties.
Nevertheless, flexibility of "substantive rights" or remedies
would not accomplish the underlying purpose of stabilizing labor
relations in the market if the common rules established by mu-
tual agreement or by decision of the arbitrator were not rooted
in the customs and usages of the parties themselves. These cus-
toms and usages grew up in the day-to-day bargaining over the
terms and conditions of the morrow's jobs. Some of the customs
were of recent origin, some of long standing, and some, indeed,
were claimed merely as talking points for a more obscure aim
not easily found without probing beneath the surface. Both em-
ployers and workers acted according to these customs and usages.
When they clashed, as they often did, it was the arbitrator's task,
if mutual adjustment failed, to explore the technological, busi-
ness, political, and other factors in the dispute. Bearing in mind
the desirability, from the standpoint of efficiency, of keeping the
bargaining process going, he might approve the customs of the
employer or of the workers, or might find a middle ground
which would prove acceptable to both sides. Conformity to the
common rules of the market was obtained by the moral sanc-
tion of threatening offenders with the ill-will of fellow workers
or fellow employers, or by the economic sanction of withholding
the privileges of the job or of the continued service of employ-
06 To a certain extent the law recognizes that both legal and equitable
remedies can not be used satisfactorily by courts in all situations. The
rise of equity courts as supplements to the common law courts is but one
illustration. Even in equity, specific performance of perzonal service
contracts has always been found impracticable, though recently there has
been a tendency to secure enforcement indirectly by the use of injunctions.
POMEROY, A TREATISE ON THE SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF CONTRC s (0d cd.
1926) §§ 22, 303-312. In this country attempts by legislatures to restrict
the use of injunctions in labor disputes have been rebuffed. Truax v.
Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, 42 Sup. Ct. 124 (1921). In England, however,
the Trades Disputes Act of 1906 eliminated both legal and equitable reme-
dies in disputes between employers and employees and between Vorlmen
growing out of employment. However, in National Sailors' and Firemen's
Union v. Reed [1926] 1 Ch. 536, Justice Astbury declared in a dictum
that the general strike of MIay, 1920 was illegal, being outside the zcope
of the Act of 1906. Since the general strike, there has been much discus-
sion of an amendment to the Act of 1906 so as to protect the consuming
public more adequately.. See Goodhart, The Legality of the Gtncrt.l Strihe
in England (1927) 36 YALE LAW JOURNAL 464. Despite the desirability of
American legislation similar to the Trades Disputes Act, it is doubtful
whether such a statute would long survive judicial interpretations of con-
stitutional law. In Massachusetts proposed legislation made tortious acts
in behalf of a trade union or employer's association non-actionable. An
advisory opinion held the proposed statute unconstitutional. Opinion of the
Justices, 211 Mass. 618, 98 N. E. 337 (1912).
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ees. This is a task requiring intimate knowledge of the indus-
try and of the psychology of employers and employees.
This process of extra-legal or extra-judicial adjustment of
employer-employee relations rests on a fundamental difference
between commodity-transactions and job-transactions. In the
job-transaction the worker delivers something that is insepar-
able from the body and will of the worker; in a commodity-trans-
action there is an exchange of things separable from the person.
This distinction was implicit in the administration of the Roch-
ester agreement. It raises two questions: (1) Are the courts of
law-indeed is our whole legal system-equipped for the task of
working out and enforcing the customs and common rules nec-
essary to achieve that degree of stabilization of the labor market
which will contribute most to economic efficiency and welfare?
(2) Should not the courts allow to extra-judicial adjustment of
labor relations at least the same freedom from legal conse-
quences that is increasingly allowed in the arbitration of com-
mercial relations?67
67 Cohen, The Law of Commercial Arbitration and the New Yorlk Statute
(1921) 31 YALE LAW JOURNAL 147; Ernst, op. cit. supra note 62; REPOR
OF COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, TRADE & COMMERCIAL LAW TO AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION (1925) especially recommendations No. 5, 6 and 7. In follow-
ing the recommendations of the Bar Association committee-that arbitra-
tion awards under "contracts" between unions and employers' associations
be enforced at law if the agreements are "in the public interest"--thero is
danger of re-introducing the inflexibility and impractical classification of
labor contracts with commodity contracts which many arbitration agree-
ments seek to avoid. It would therefore seem desirable to discuss and
perhaps experiment with some such safeguards as the following: (1) No
judicial interference until the remedies under the arbitration agreement
have been exhausted; (2) Judicial acceptance of arbitrator's award as con-
clusive of the facts and also, as far as possible, conclusive of the law; (3)
Remand the case to the arbitrator if, subsequent to his award, one of the
parties seeks to introduce new evidence in an action at law. This procedure
has been deemed necessary to make effective the work of such administra-
tive bodies as the Federal Trade Commission and certain Public Utility
Commissions-the Railroad Commission of Wisconsin, for example. Wis.
Stat. 1923, c. 196, § 44; (4) Designation of one court in each jurisdiction
to hear all cases appealing from an arbitration award. Cf. Wis. Stat.
1923, c. 196, § 41 in the case of the Railroad Commission. If we are to
have judicial review of arbitration awards, it seems reasonable that the
parties should have the benefit of judicial opinions that are founded on the
familiarity with technical details which is most likely to result from spe-
eialization.
